This article examines the interpretation of "the enemies" in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana (60) by the Jordanian ideologue Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, one of the most influential jihādī-Salafī theorists alive. Al-Maqdisī's reading of the sūra's text and his interpretation of its context turn this part of the Qurʾān, which seems to have been meant to warn the early Medinan Muslims of the dangers of befriending hostile Meccan idolaters, into the basis of a radical ideology. Special attention is paid to the far-reaching consequences of al-Maqdisī's political interpretation of the text, especially when combined with his views on kufr (unbelief ) and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loyalty and disavowal), which he adopts from Wahhābī scholars and bases mostly on this sūra. Al-Maqdisī's particular combination of the text and context of sūra 60 yields a definition of "the enemy" that is rooted in the Qurʾān and Sunna but differs greatly from its traditional interpretations as well as Wahhābī writings by evolving into a radical ideology to overthrow the political rulers of the Muslim world.
Introduction
This article examines the interpretation of "the enemies" in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana (60) by the Jordanian ideologue Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, one of the most influential theorists of radical Islam alive. Although he is not as well-known as Usāma b. Lādin or Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī, al-Maqdisī's ideological influence among radical Muslims is probably greater than that of the leaders of al-Qāʿida. He has been described as "the mufti or the godfather" of the jihādī movement 2 and has inspired individuals ranging from Saudi 3 and Jordanian 4 militants to Mohammed Bouyeri 5 , the murderer of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh. Furthermore, he was singled out by an American research project as "the key contemporary ideologue in the jihadi intellectual universe" and "the most influential living jihadi theorist". 6 Born in the village of Barqā (near Nāblus) on the West Bank in 1959, al-Maqdisī, whose real name is ʿIṣām b. Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir al-Barqāwī 7 , seems to have radicalised through his reading of Wahhābī writings and his contacts with the followers of Juhaymān al-ʿUtaybī (d. 1980) 8 in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1980s. It was here and in Afghanistan, where he went during the war against the Soviets, that he was most influenced by the tenets of Salafism, a strict form of Islam that tries to emulate the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), a term used to refer to the first generations of Islam. 9 Salafīs emphasise the importance of the unity of God (tawḥīd ) as a strict form of monotheism that manifests itself not only in the belief in a single god but also in other areas such as worship, which must not include any cultural or religious innovations (bidaʿ, plural of bid ʿa), or legislation, which must conform to Islamic law (sharīʿa). Any deviation from these norms is considered sinful in the eyes of Salafīs and can in certain cases even be condemned as an attempt to ascribe partners to God (shirk). Salafīs also apply the same strictness to their treatment of the sources of Islam, focussing entirely on a literal reading of the Qurʾān and Sunna and refusing rationalism and analogous reasoning (qiyās) as sources of the sharī ʿa. They therefore do not accept the various schools of Islamic law (madhāhib, plural of madhhab) and refuse to follow the rulings of any particular tradition (taqlīd ) but advocate a return to individual interpretation of the Qurʾān and Sunna (ijtihād ). Salafīs, however, are not a homogeneous group. Although they share many ideological characteristics such as the ones mentioned above, there are sometimes significant doctrinal differences between them and they vary widely in their preferred ways of dealing with society and politics. A distinction has been made between so-called purists, who refuse any political involvement and concentrate on teaching and the propagation of their message (daʿwa); politicos, who are involved in politics and actively try to influence a country's policies and laws; and jihādīs, whose contention is often expressed violently since they see jihād as a valid (or even the best) way to bring about complete tawḥīd in society and politics.
11 Al-Maqdisī is an adherent to and ideologue of the jihādī branch of Salafism and it is as such that he became known as the mentor of the Jordanian terrorist Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī, whom he later publicly criticised for targeting other Muslims in Iraq with suicide bombings.
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Central to al-Maqdisī's ideology is the concept of al-walāʾ wa-lbarāʾ, which refers to the complete loyalty (walāʾ or muwālāt) that Muslims should show to God, Islam and other Muslims while expressing disavowal (barāʾ) of and staying away from everything else. Arabic and Islam, vol. 7, 1986, pp. 140-145. continued to be applied after the founding of Saudi Arabia, which adopted Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's ideas as its doctrinal underpinnings, to legitimise and enforce the country's rigid moral policies. As we will see, however, in the jihādī-Salafī ideology of al-Maqdisī, al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ transcends the strictly religious sphere and becomes a radical theory with great implications for politics as well. It is also through the prism of jihādī-Salafī ideas that al-Maqdisī views the enemies of the Muslims as mentioned in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana. Al-Maqdisī's radical reading of the sūra's text and his interpretation of its context turn this part of the Qurʾān, which seems to have been meant to warn the early Medinan Muslims of the dangers of be friending hostile Meccan idolaters, into the basis of a radical ideology.
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In the following, this article tries to identify the "enemies" of the Muslims in this sūra by analysing the context of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana, its treatment in the various books of exegesis (tafsīr), how this differs from al-Maqdisī's interpretation and what political implications the latter's opinions have. It then goes on to analyse the actual text of the sūra by looking at what the classical exegetes (mufassirūn), Wahhābī scholars and al-Maqdisī have written about it. Special attention is paid to the radical consequences of a political interpretation of the text, particularly when combined with al-Maqdisī's views on unbelief (kufr) and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, which he bases mostly on this sūra. Al-Maqdisī's particular combination of the text and context of sūra 60 yields a definition of "the enemy" that is rooted in the Qurʾān and Sunna but differs greatly from its traditional interpretations by evolving into a radical ideology to overthrow the political rulers of the Muslim world. 
The Story of Ḥāṭib b. Abī Baltaʿa
The context in which Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana is said to have been revealed revolves around the Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) of Ḥāṭib b. Abī Baltaʿa. He was an early convert to Islam and had joined the Prophet Muḥammad in fleeing from hostilities in Mecca by making the hijra (emigration) to Medina in 622 AD. He had also participated in the battle of Badr against the Meccans in 624. After several years of hostile relations between the Muslims in Medina and the pagans in Mecca, the two sides decided to draw up a treaty at Ḥudaybiyya in 628, so that attacks between them would cease. After a breach of the treaty by a tribe allied to the Meccans, however, the Muslims decided to conquer that city in 630. According to Islamic tradition, it is at this point that the story of Ḥāṭib begins. 16 The impending attack by the Muslims posed a problem for Ḥāṭib, since he feared this might endanger his family, who had not converted to Islam and had stayed in Mecca. He had further reason to fear for his relatives' lives as they-like Ḥāṭib himself-were not originally from Mecca and therefore had no automatic tribal protection from possible threats by Meccans who might want to take revenge for Ḥāṭib's conversion to Islam and his fighting against them. Islamic tradition has it that Ḥāṭib tried to solve his problem by secretly sending a letter to the Meccans to warn them of the attack at hand. By thus betraying the Muslims, he hoped to win the Meccans' favour and persuade them to protect his family. Muḥammad found out about this, however, and sent ʿAlī, al-Zubayr and perhaps one other person (either al-Miqdād 18 or Abū Marthad 19 ) to retrieve this letter at Rawḍat Khākh. 20 They found it and brought it back to Muḥammad, who read it and subsequently asked Ḥāṭib for an explanation. The rest of the ḥadīth contains four crucial points that figure in all later exegetical attempts to make sense of Ḥāṭib's story: Ḥāṭib's explanation that he had only written the letter out of fear for his family in Mecca and that he had not done so out of disbelief or apostasy (ridda); Muḥammad's statement that Ḥāṭib had spoken the truth about this; the remark by ʿUmar, one of the Prophet's companions who would later become the second Caliph, that Ḥāṭib was a traitor who should be beheaded 21 ; and Muḥammad's subsequent statement that Ḥāṭib had participated in the battle of Badr and that God had perhaps granted such men forgiveness, no matter what they do.
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At first glance, Ḥāṭib's story may seem rather straightforward. The question is, however, why Ḥāṭib, who so obviously committed a major sin by betraying the Muslims and showing loyalty (muwālāt) to their enemies, is not declared an unbeliever (kāfir) by Muḥammad. What is interesting about the scholars who try to explain why Ḥāṭib was not accused of kufr, is that they all use the four crucial points from the ḥadīth mentioned above to "prove" that their interpretation is the correct one. The first of these scholars is Ibn al-ʿArabī (1076-1148), who claims that Ḥāṭib was not declared a kāfir because his actions, which were undoubtedly sinful, did not emanate from unbelief in his heart, as Ḥāṭib himself told Muḥammad. Since the Prophet confirmed that this was the truth, Muslims can safely assume that Ḥāṭib was indeed not lying. He had acted with the goal of saving his family in Mecca, which is a worldly motive (gharaḍ dunyawī) and not sufficient reason for declaring someone an infidel (takfīr). 23 An exegete who agrees with this explanation is al-Qurṭubī (d. 1273), stating that a worldly motive for helping the enemy against the Muslims is in itself no reason for takfīr, provided the culprit believes in his heart. 24 In spite of his not being an infidel, however, both scholars do believe Ḥāṭib deserved punishment for his act. While al-Qurṭubī gives no conclusive answer as to why Ḥāṭib escaped punishment, Ibn al-ʿArabī believes the reason for this can be found in his participation in the battle of Badr. This, he believes, is the reason why Muḥammad rebukes ʿUmar for threatening to behead Ḥāṭib, a punishment that would normally have been justified. 25 An entirely different approach to the story of Ḥāṭib is taken by al-Jaṣṣāṣ (917-982), a medieval exegete who believes that Ḥāṭib was not spared from being labelled a kāfir by his believing heart but by his incorrect interpretation (taʾwīl ) of Islam. He states that Ḥāṭib was apparently convinced that showing loyalty to the enemies of the Muslims to protect his family was allowed and that he would not cease to be a Muslim by doing so. Although Ḥāṭib was wrong in assuming this, he honestly believed it, a fact proven by Muḥam-mad's confirmation of his words. Moreover, ʿUmar's threat to execute Ḥāṭib was justified, which is why he made it in the first place, but was undone by the fact that Ḥāṭib had participated in the battle of Badr, as can be seen in Muḥammad's statement that God may forgive such men whatever they do. The relevance of this ḥadīth and its explanations becomes clear when the interpretations of the story of Ḥāṭib are extrapolated to the general question of takfīr. If, as Ibn al-ʿArabī and al-Qurṭubī contend, Ḥāṭib was saved from takfīr by the belief in his heart, any modern-day lesson drawn from his story would have to include that one cannot decide whether someone is a kāfir or not unless one knows a person's heart. Whereas the early Muslims could still rely on Muḥammad's judgement in such situations, as they apparently did in the story of Ḥāṭib, this is obviously no longer the case. This means that as long as a Muslim does not openly admit to being an apostate, labelling him or her a kāfir is virtually impossible. If, on the other hand, al-Jaṣṣāṣ is right and Ḥāṭib was spared the label of kāfir because he had made an incorrect interpretation, the situation is entirely different. In such a case, one could argue that it does not matter whether a Muslim's sinful acts are supported by unbelief in his or her heart. Although this is not necessarily what al-Jaṣṣāṣ intended, it does make takfīr possible again since finding out about a person's true beliefs is no longer needed as a condition to call someone a kāfir.
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The latter interpretation is the one supported by al-Maqdisī and this is not a coincidence. Al-Maqdisī believes that the present-day political rulers of the Muslim world are infidels because they rule on the basis of un-Islamic laws. This, according to al-Maqdisī, is enough to declare them infidels since the Qurʾān itself says in sūra 5: 44 that "whoso judges not (man lam yaḥkum) according to what 27) The debate on kufr in general is slightly more complicated than this since scholars consider some sins, such as concrete idol-worshipping, to be so great that it is no longer necessary to know whether such a sinner actually believes in his or her heart or not. This debate touches on questions such as the relation between actions and faith (īmān), what constitutes faith and whether it can increase and decrease or not. God has sent down-they are the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn)". 28 As al-Maqdisī interprets this verse as referring also to political rule that is not based on Islamic law (sharīʿa), he does not hesitate to apply takfīr to modern-day politicians. 29 He equates their actions with Ḥāṭib's betrayal of the Muslims by stating that just as he showed loyalty to the enemies of the Muslims, so do political leaders show loyalty to man-made laws over those given by God. The only way al-Maqdisī can conclude this is by stating that politicians' alleged sins should automatically lead to takfīr, with or without knowledge of any true belief in their hearts. If al-Maqdisī had supported the first interpretation of Ḥāṭib's story, he would have required a concrete admission of unbelief from politicians, which is highly unlikely. AlMaqdisī thus believes that political leaders are guilty of the same sin as Ḥāṭib, with one major difference: he contends that Ḥāṭib, who lived at a time when Islam was still developing, could use the excuse of misinterpretation to escape takfīr; modern-day politicians, however, who have the completed message of Islam at their disposal, cannot possibly do the same.
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Because of interpretations such as al-Maqdisī's, who is not the only jihādī-Salafī ideologue to espouse such ideas 31 , the story of Ḥāṭib has become quite important in Salafī discussions of this topic. In their treatment of the concept of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, al-Maqdisī's ideological opponents within the Salafī movement stress that Ḥāṭib's act cannot be called downright loyalty to the kuffār since that would require unbelief in one's heart. 32 Al-Maqdisī's hotly contested inter- and you because you believe in God your Lord"). The verse also points out that Ḥāṭib's secret plan was no use ("yet I know very well what you conceal and what you publish") and that God considers such actions deviations ("whosoever of you does that, has gone astray from the right way"). The rest of the sūra, which consists of 13 verses, can be divided into five different parts. The first part (verses 1-3) basically expands on the words mentioned above by warning the Muslims once more against the Meccans' evil intentions (verse 2), stating that family ties-the reason Ḥāṭib wrote his letter-"shall not profit you upon the Day of Resurrection" and that "God sees the things you do" (verse 3). The second part of the sūra (verses 4-6) tells the Muslims of Medina how they should behave towards the pagans in Mecca. It points to the "good example" (uswa ḥasana) of Abraham, who disavowed his own people and their idolatry ("We are quit of you (innā buraʾāʾu minkum) and that you serve, apart from God") and stated that there would be "enmity and hatred" (al-ʿadāwa wa-lbaghḍāʾ) between them until they accepted God alone (verse 4). Forgiveness is asked for in verse 5 while the next one refers to the example of Abraham again. The third part of sūra 60 consists of verses 7-9. The first two of these soften Muslim-pagan relations as described in the preceding verses somewhat by pointing out that God might bring "love" (mawadda) between the warring parties again (verse 7) and that he allows friendly relations with those Meccans who did not fight the Muslims for their religion (verse 8). God does prohibit, however, that those Meccans who fought the Muslims because of their Islamic beliefs, threw them out of their houses or aided others in doing so be taken as friends. This is because "whosoever takes them for friends, those-they are the evildoers" (verse 9).
Verses 10-12 form the fourth part of the sūra and command the believers to test the Muslim women who flee to Medina after the treaty of Ḥudaybiyya, since it was stipulated in this treaty that Meccans joining the Muslims should be sent back. This sūra commands, however, that if such a tested woman (al-mumtaḥana, hence the name of the sūra) is indeed a true Muslima, she should be accepted into the community and not be sent back to Mecca. 35 Muslims should, on the other hand, not remain married to unbelieving women but should sever ties with them (verses 10 and 12). Unbelieving women fleeing the Medinan community for Mecca should be left to go, however (verse 11). The fifth and final part of the sūra is formed by verse 13. It points out again that Muslims should not take certain people as their friends. As the focus in this article will be on the definition of the Muslims' enemies in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana by the classical exegetes, Wahhābīs and al-Maqdisī, verses 10-13 will not be dealt with since they do not really focus on this topic.
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The Exegetes' "Enemies" Several verses in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana refer specifically to the "enemy" (ʿadūw, verse 1) or "enemies" (aʿdāʾ, verse 2) of the Muslims or to people whom the Muslims view with "enmity" (ʿadāwa, verse 4; ʿadaytum minhum, verse 7). We can get an idea of what kind of people these words refer to by looking at verses 1, 8 and 9 in more detail since they describe who the enemies of the Muslims are, while verse 4 tells the Muslims how they should deal with them. Because of the clear links between verse 1, the Mecca-Medina rivalry in general and the story of Ḥāṭib in particular, it seems obvious that the enemies referred to in this verse are Meccans. The verse further informs us that they are not Muslims ("they have disbelieved") and have fought the Muslims because of their religion ("because you 35) The verses 10-12 should probably be seen in the context of the violation of the treaty of Ḥudaybiyya by a tribe allied to the Quraysh. As mentioned, the treaty stipulated that any Qurayshites who joined the Muslims in Medina without permission from their guardians were to be sent back but Muslims who went back to Mecca could stay there. believe in God your Lord"). This last part is significant because it leaves other kuffār, who did not fight the Muslims because of their religion or refrained from hostilities altogether, outside the realm of enemies. Verse 1 therefore seems to suggest that the enemies mentioned here are the unbelieving Meccans who fought the Muslims because of their religion and not for any other reason. This is also what almost all works of tafsīr consulted for this article conclude. They usually simply confirm the text with a few words of their own.
37 Quṭb (1906 Quṭb ( -1966 , however, stresses this point by explaining that "they expelled the messenger and the believers only because they believed in God their Lord. 5: 51, which deals with Jews and Christians in similar words. The implication of this is that, according to Ibn Kathīr, verse 1 can be seen as referring to a much broader group of enemies, including all unbelievers and not just the pagan Meccans who had fought the Muslims for their religion. 39 The question of who the enemies in sūra 60 are becomes more complicated as the verses become more specific. Whereas the exegetes are almost unanimous in their explanation of verse 1, this is certainly not the case with verses 8 and 9. These state that Several exegetes state that these verses refer to a number of tribes with whom Muḥammad had established a pact before the treaty of Ḥudaybiyya and who had not been involved in the violation of the latter. Verse 8, according to these exegetes, thus confirms that the Muslims are allowed to remain on friendly terms with these tribes. 40 Some of the exegetes who apply verse 8 to specific tribes explain the enmity mentioned in both verse 8 and 9 as emanating from hostility towards the Muslims because of their religion. 41 Most scholars dealing with this issue, however, apply these verses to those Meccans who fought the Muslims (without focussing on any particular reason why) or to the pagans in Mecca in general. 42 In fact, there are even exegetes who interpret verse 8 as referring to enemies who fought the Muslims for religious reasons but who apply verse 9 to all (hostile) pagans in Mecca 43 and vice versa. 44 The interpretation of verse 8 is further complicated by the theory of "the abrogating and the abrogated" (al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh), according to which the problem of contradictory verses is solved by replacing the one that came first by a later verse. Several exegetes claim that verse 8 was abrogated by sūra 9: 5, which seems to have a more aggressive character and does not distinguish between hostile and friendly pagans. 45 In spite of the different interpretations of verses 8 and 9, there is a general tendency among the exegetes to explain the verses in the context of Mecca-Medina conflicts. This leads most of them to apply the enmity spoken of in this sūra to the polytheists in Mecca, the hostile polytheists from that town or only the ones that are hostile because of the Muslims' religion. Just like with verse 1, however, one exception was found among the exegetes who tried to explain this issue and again it was Ibn Kathīr. Once more, this scholar broadens the definition of the Muslims' enemies by including not only polytheists from Mecca or even in general but also nonMuslim monotheists by equating verse 9 with sūra 5: 51, which refers specifically to Jews and Christians. 
The Wahhābīs' "Enemies"
It is not clear what the exact influence of Ibn Kathīr's diverging interpretation of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana has been. What is sure, however, is that interpreting parts of sūra 60 as pertaining not just to Meccan polytheists but also to other non-Muslims became more widespread among later scholars. The most prominent of these were (and are) the Wahhābīs, who have been heavily influenced by scholars like Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) and their teacher Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). As mentioned before, Wahhābī scholars attach great value to purifying Islam and have used the concept of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ to achieve this. In their efforts to rid Islam of religious innovations, Wahhābīs have applied barāʾ to unbelievers to make sure that Muslims would not be influenced by their supposedly corrupting religious practices and forms of worship. 47 One of the Qurʾānic passages they cite as proof of the correctness of their ideas is sūra 60: 4, which states that You have had a good example in Abraham, and those with him, when they said to their people, 'We are quit of you and that you serve (innā buraʾāʾu minkum wa mimmā taʿbudūna), apart from God (min dūn Allāh). We disbelieve in you (kafarnā bikum), and between us and you enmity (al-ʿadāwa) has shown itself, and hatred (al-baghḍāʾ) for ever, until you believe in God alone (ḥatta tuʾminūna bi-llāh waḥdahu).' […] Read in the context of the rest of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana, this verse should be seen as an alternative to Ḥāṭib's loyalty to the Meccans and as an example for the Muslims in Medina of how they should deal with their enemies. These enemies, as we have seen above, were almost unanimously seen as the (hostile) surroundings such a good example for Ḥāṭib and his fellow believers, who were struggling to find the correct way to deal with their enemies. It is therefore only natural to assume that verse 4 informs us that Abraham disavowed the pagan religion and the idols of his people and not other religions in general. This is, in fact, the almost unanimous conclusion of the exegetes consulted for this article, who view Abraham's disavowal as directed at idols (ṭawāghīt, awthān, aṣnām), other gods (āliha), partners (andād ), stars (kawākib), the specific religion of Abraham's people (dīnakum) or a combination of these terms or similar, semantically related words. Saudi grand muftī (Islamic legal advisor), who uses verse 4 to "prove" that Muslims should follow Abraham in showing "enmity" and "hatred" to "unbelievers" in general. 51 He even applies sūra 60: 4 specifically to Jews and other religions, arguing explicitly against inter-religious dialogue, thereby completely ignoring the verse's original context of (hostile) pagans from Mecca in the 7 th century.
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Al-Maqdisī's "Enemies"
The interpretation of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana verse 4 by many Wahhābīs is clearly devoid of any consideration for the story of Ḥāṭib or its general context. Still, at least the Wahhābī interpretations remained in the religious sphere, which cannot be said of al-Maqdisī's explanation of sūra 60: 4, which is the basis of his version of al-walāʾ wal-barāʾ. In al-Maqdisī's view, verse 4-the only part of this sūra he really quotes frequently-should also be applied in a political context. As we have seen in al-Maqdisī's interpretation of the story of Ḥāṭib, he believes that present-day political rulers should be seen as kuffār because of their loyalty to man-made laws over those of the sharīʿa. Al-Maqdisī takes the matter even further by stating that rulers are not only infidels but also idols. He justifies this by quoting sūra 9: 31, which states that Jews and Christians "have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords (arbāban) apart from God […]". To al-Maqdisī, this means that sources of legislation, be they rabbis, monks or political rulers, should really be seen as "lords" or, more specifically, idols or gods apart from God. to al-Maqdisī, apparently no objection to seeing the latter as idols (ṭawāghīt).
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Al-Maqdisī thus believes that political rule through man-made laws can be equated with creating an idol of oneself since other people follow this legislation, which should be seen as a form of worship. On the basis of this argument, al-Maqdisī concludes that there is no Islamic rule in the entire Muslim world and that all rulers of Islamic countries are really ṭawāghīt, thereby making politicians the real enemies in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana. 54 This conclusion is entirely different from the explanations of verse 4 given by any of the exegetes or scholars cited so far. Still, al-Maqdisī does interpret the verse as referring to idol-worshipping again. This not only entails that his ideology presents rulers as fundamentally un-Islamic because of their supposed violation of the absolute monotheism of God (tawḥīd) but it also makes al-Maqdisī seem consistent with both earlier writings on Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana, which also saw verse 4 as directed at idols and idolatry, as well as the Qurʾān itself. This is why al-Maqdisī is able to mix his own ideas with the literal text of verse 4, coming up with statements such as To all of them… we say: "We are quit of you and that you serve, apart from God" Quit of your rotten laws, methods, constitutions and principles… Quit of your rotten governments, courts, slogans and media… "We disbelieve in you, and between us and you enmity has shown itself, and hatred for ever, until you believe in God alone" Al-Maqdisī even goes so far as to paraphrase the actual words of sūra 60: 4 by stating that
We disbelieve in you and your infidel constitutions and between us and you enmity has shown itself, and hatred for ever, until you return to the legislation of God the most high alone […]. 56 Al-Maqdisī's attempts to look and sound consistent with the sources while actually moving away from their traditional interpretation goes even further in his version of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, in which all his major ideas converge. Using verse 4 as the basis of his ideology, he states that Muslims need to emulate Abraham. The exhortation to follow "the religion of Abraham" (millat Ibrāhīm) can not just be found in sūra 60: 4 but also in other verses, such as 2: 130 and 16: 123. Al-Maqdisī, however, probably took the idea from Juhaymān al-'Utaybī, who proposed it years before him. 57 According to alMaqdisī, the millat Ibrāhīm consists of "loyalty (ikhlāṣ) to the worship of God alone in every meaning that the word worship encompasses" and "disavowal of polytheism and its people", in other words: alwalāʾ wa-l-barāʾ. 58 As we have seen in his interpretation of the story of Ḥāṭib, al-Maqdisī sees adherence to un-Islamic laws as misplaced walāʾ and believes that politicians guilty of this are kuffār. Moreover, al-Maqdisī's interpretation of sūra 60: 4 means that the example of Abraham's disavowal should first and foremost be applied to the political rulers who, apart from being infidels, are also idols. 59 The best way of following Abraham in showing barāʾ to idols and their followers is, according to al-Maqdisī, jihād since this is the clearest
Conclusion
This article has shown that the exact meaning of both the contextual story of Ḥāṭib b. Abī Baltaʿa and the text of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana is controversial. Whereas most scholars explain the ḥadīth of Ḥāṭib in such a way that true unbelief in a person's heart is needed to call someone a kāfir, Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī disagrees and uses his own interpretation to justify takfīr of modern-day politicians because of their adherence to and rule through man-made laws. The same applies to the "enemies" in Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana, who are viewed by most exegetes as the 7 th -century idolaters from Mecca who challenged the Muslims in Medina. Many Wahhābīs, however, leave the historical Meccan dimension out of their own readings of sūra 60 by applying verse 4 to unbelievers in general as part of their interpretation of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ. Al-Maqdisī goes even further in this by adding a political dimension to verse 4. He deems politi cians not only infidels because they follow man-made laws but also considers them to be idols because of their role in creating these laws and demanding others' adherence to them, which he equates with polytheistic worship. This way, he turns contemporary political rulers into what he sees as the true enemies of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana. According to al-Maqdisī, the best way to challenge these enemies is by waging jihād against them since this is the highest form of barāʾ. Al-Maqdisī thus uses the religious concept of al-walāʾ wal-barāʾ to turn a sūra about 7 th -century idol-worshippers from Mecca into a radical theory to overthrow the political rulers of the Muslim world.
In spite of the fact that al-Maqdisī's unorthodox opinions of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana as well as his interpretation of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ show a distinct lack of attention for the context in which sūra 60 was allegedly revealed, he does display a clever use of the sources. His views are clearly very different from those espoused by exegetes and Wahhābī scholars. Yet by painting modern-day politicians as exponents of shirk, his opinion on who the real enemies of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana are, is seemingly quite similar to the one held by most exegetes. This becomes particularly clear in al-Maqdisī's interpretation of al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, which he consciously positions in Wahhābī tradition. By portraying himself as doing nothing more than taking al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ to its natural consequences, he appears to be firmly rooted in Wahhābī tradition, while in fact deviating greatly from it. Although a detailed look at al-Maqdisī's radical reading of Sūrat al-Mumtaḥana and al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ reveals a clear break with both Wahhābīsm and traditional Islamic scholarship, his adoption of the Wahhābī mantle is sure to increase his religious stature in the eyes of many.
